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Introduction 
This paper seeks to draw attention to a neglected but essential element of 
institutions, their boundaries? Boundaries penn it actors to organize the world around 
them into categories and groups and to establish arenas of authority or jurisdiction. 
Scholars too often assume that boundaries between groups are fIrm and clear, and assume 
that these distinctions form the basis for social hierarchies and divisions of labor? 
However, the nature of boundaries is no less important to institutional operation and 
social organization than is the fact of their existence. As the fIrst step in a larger research 
program, this paper addresses the importance that the existence and nature of boundaries 
has in creating and regulating social organization, but also the political signifIcance that 
the changes in boundaries has. Examples from international laws regarding state 
sovereignty, human rights, and humanitarian law highlight what boundaries do and how 
they vary, as well as to raise a set of theoretical questions to guide further investigation. 
Interest in institutional boundaries stems from puzzles arising out of IR research. 
IR theorists' ability to understand and explain institutional change largely turns on the 
manner in which they conceptualize the boundaries of key institutions, in particular those 
of the sovereign state. This paper marks a fIrst effort at laying out the rationale for an 
investigation of institutional boundaries in international relations in order to develop a 
research program that examines how and why boundaries matter as well how they arise 
2 I draw significantly on my previous collaboration with John Leslie in the discussion of institutional 
boundaries. See John C. Leslie and Anne L. Clunan, "Bounding Institutional Authority in Comparative 
Politics and International Relations," Prepared for delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, September 2 - September 5, 2004. Copyright by the American Political 
Science Association. My thanks to John Leslie for permission to rely on that collaboration here. 
3 Explanations of nationalism such as those of Deutsch, Gellner, Haas, Benedict Anderson are obvious 
exceptions to this. 
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institutional boundaries even less well-defined, as "various units." This neglect of the 
limits that boundaries place on the authority relations inside of and across institutions 
represents a significant gap in these literatures and our understanding of institutions. 
Institutions are embedded in "societies,,6 with other institutions and, because actors 
navigate not only within institutions· but also between them, it is important to understand 
not only how the "rules of the game" work, but also how far they extend.7 By recognizing 
that institutions create not only authority relations but also "jurisdictions" we can increase 
our understanding of how institutions come into being, how they change or reproduce, 
and how they shape the behavior of actors. 
Institutional boundaries and institutional origins 
The new economic and historical institutionalisms arose to explain cooperation in 
circumstance where there is strategic interaction and cooperation is problematic, but their 
neglect of boundaries causes them to limit their understanding of the forms of 
cooperation.8 The central problem for the new institutionalisms was how to explain 
cooperation among actors with common interests but different preferences. For rational 
choice institutionalists, conflict is a dysfunctional consequence of information 
asymmetries, transaction costs, and coordination problems that institutions permit actors 
to overcome. An assumed universal definition of rationality or utility, however, often 
bridges these conflicts, extending boundaries out infinitely. Clever institutional designers, 
it is implied, can always fmd the common ground and manage conflicts. 
6 Note that "society" and "social" refer to particular groupings of actors. "Society" can refer to the 
community of individuals bounded by a state or it can refer to the anarchic "society" of nation states. 
7 Mark Granovetter. "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness ," in American 
Journal of Sociology Vo1.91 ,No.3 (November 1985), pp.481-510. 
8 Douglass North. Institutions. Institutional Change. and Economic Performance, (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990). p.l6. 
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the focus on reproduction of institutional forms tends to blur the impact that a small 
change in institutional boundary may have for other institutions in society. 
Recognition that institutional construction is socially embedded points to the dual 
role that boundaries play "inside" and "outside" institutions and the "critical" nature of 
the junctures in which they are created. They designate who mayor must conform to 
rules defining authority "within" an institution. The creation of sovereign boundaries 
designates some people, those on the territory of the sovereign, as subject to its rules. An 
institution of ethnic identity generates rules about how the group's members must behave 
to continue to belong to the group. But they also demarcate the extent of those rules and 
how an institution and its members interact with other institutions. Creating an ethnic 
group also implies certain accepted ways of behaving towards those outside the group.12 
Drawing sovereign boundaries entails recognizing lack of authority over aliens as well as 
citizens abroad. Defining such relations is critical not only to the institution's own 
survival but also to the survival of other institutions and, perhaps, the survival of 
society.13 This interdependence points to the fact that the boundaries of important 
institutions are likely to crystallize at the same time and as part of a larger process. Actors 
reach "settlements" that create full-fledged cooperation in some institutions even as they 
embed conflicting values in other institutions that exist parallel to one another. In 
establishing one area of authority and jurisdiction where certain actors have certain 
powers and roles, boundaries also create the negative of the institution in establishing 
realms where such authority, jurisdiction, powers and roles do not apply. Subsequently, 
12 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 90, No.4. (Dec., 1996), pp. 715-735. 
13 This has been the focus of the population ecology school in organizational theory. See Hannan and 
Freeman (1987). 
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Institutional boundaries do a number of things: they protect the institution; they 
provide institutional continuity; they define who a member of the institutional club is; 
they establish rights of institutions, placing them in particular positions vis-a.-vis each 
other within a society; and they constrain actors' behavior across and within institutions. 
As such, it is the boundaries of institutions that make social order possible.16 Boundaries 
are established to shield institutions from external pressures and influences as much as to 
create internal authority relations. They help ensure institutional survival because they 
provide a measure of security and a legal or normative basis on which to challenge 
incursions and violations .17 Sovereignty functions in this manner at the international 
level, helping to ensure the survival of weak states. IS Domestically, the boundaries of US 
non-profit status allow 501(c)(3) organizations to guard against their take-over by 
potentially more power political interests, serving thereby to enable institutional survival 
as well as broader social goals of public interest. Boundaries also help to guarantee 
institutional continuity by designating the institution rather than actors within it as the 
carrier of autonomy. Just as political parties are recognized to still exist despite changes 
in party leadership or platform, states do not cease to exist when their governments 
change or are not recognized. 19 
Institutional boundaries serve social order by determining whether and how 
institutions "fit" into the societies of which they are part. In short, boundaries define how 
settlements regulating conflicts and cooperation within an institution conform to broader 
16 Holsti (2004), pp . 116-118. 
17 Holsti(2004),pp . 116-117. 
18 Jackson (1990) and Hoisti (2004). 
19 Holsti (2004), p. 117. 
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Rules defming boundaries bring individuals in line with the decision-making 
mechanisms that make collective action possible within the institution?3 At the same 
time they force individual behavior to conform to rules governing relationships between 
one institution and others. They provide authoritative rules about behavior that tell 
individuals how to navigate complex social environments where groups and institutions 
pursue different preferences?4 The government of Iran was cast out by international 
society for failing to prevent and then approving the actions of militant students, not 
government officials, actions which were contrary to international society's values of 
maintaining inter-state interaction and the equal inviolability of sovereigns. Iran was 
punished for not forcing its individual citizens to conform to the rules governing relations 
among states within international society. While Iran continues to pursue values at odds 
with many other states, it no longer pursues behaviors that directly challenge the core 
values of an international society of sovereign states.25 Institutional boundaries force 
individual behavior to conform to higher-level values embedded in social structure. The 
boundaries of institutions, therefore, reflect conflicts and compromises not only between 
the members of an institution, but also between the protagonists of different values in 
society. 
Institutions win legitimacy and broader support by reinforcing social values?6 By 
organizing social space and transmitting the hierarchy of societal values through to the 
23 Ira Katznelson, "Periodization and Preferences: Reflections on Purposive Action in Comparative 
Historical Social Science," in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., Comparative Historical 
Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge University Press, 2002), p295; Charles Taylor, "Modernity and 
Identity ," in Joan W. Scott and Debra Keates, eds., Schools of Thought, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), p.l39-53. 
24 Frederik Barth, "Introduction," in idem., ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Oslo: Universitaetsforlaget, 
1969), pp.l5-17; Katznelson, (2002), p.295. 
2S Brownlie (2003), p. 342. 
26 Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986). 
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a broader frame of ordering and preserving fundamental societal values such as freedom 
of expression, religion, association and assembly. Thus, because boundaries project 
"settlements" about societal values over individuals' behavior, institutions acquire 
legitimacy and broad support in the societies of which they are part. 
Institutional boundaries, variance, and behavior 
The new institutionalisms' neglect of boundaries also blinds them to important 
effects of institutions on actor behavior. A central focus of historical institutionalists , in 
particular, has been explaining how actors construct similar institutions differently in 
different places. 31 Likewise, constructivists have sought to explain how variations on the 
institution of the nation-state affect the nature of inter-state interaction.32 Differing 
institutional structures then become an explanation for variance in actor behavior. The 
historical institutionalist and constructivist argument about the origins of behavioral 
variance can be applied to institutional boundaries. Doing so provides insights into 
behaviors that an exclusive focus on authority relations within institutions might 
overlook. 
These explanations of institutional variance extend neatly to institutional 
boundaries. Although all institutional boundaries organize social settlements over 
individual behavior, similar institutions can have different rules that govern their 
31 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," in Sven 
Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, Structuring Politics (Cambridge U.K. and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
32 John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," 
International Organization 47, no. 1 (1993), Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: 
Norms and Identity in World Politics, 1st ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), Alexander 
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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institution and whether they pennit actors within the institution to wield influence in 
other arenas. Does society condone through particular boundary regulations the influence 
of some actors or institutions on the decision making of other institutions or not? How do 
authority relations inside the institution mesh with the hierarchies that govern other 
institutions and society itself? Do boundary regulations create privileged chaimels of 
influence for some types of actors or do they seek to limit them, forcing contests to 
influence institutional decision making into more transparent or competitive arenas? 
These questions are not new, but the concerns of an "old" institutionalism of 
Montesquieu and Madison. 
This "old" institutionalism recognized explicitly that institutional boundaries are 
mechanisms that enforce societies' preferences over individual behavior, elevating some 
values while subordinating others. While the "old" institutionalism focused on the 
boundaries of fonnal governmental institutions, however, the problem of boundaries 
extending wherever there are institutions. Classically, four mechanisms have permitted 
actors to influence decision making across institutional boundaries: 1) fonnal rules that 
specify such influence (often backed up by state power); 2) control over resources critical 
to an institution; 3) the personal union of decision-making roles in different institutions; 
and 4) ideological affinity. Boundaries that proscribe such mechanisms are relatively 
impenneable, such as anti-trust laws that prohibit collusion among finns or campaign 
financing and conflict-of-interest rules. Those that condone them are more penneable, 
such as the overlapping jurisdictions of federal states. 
The relative permeability of institutional boundaries touches on many types of 
behavioral outcomes. Boundary regulations have perhaps their greatest impact on the 
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from international relations that demonstrate how, by creating or blocking channels of 
influence between actors in different arenas, institutional boundaries create different 
patterns of behavior and social order. 
Redefining Sovereignty: Universal Jurisdiction's Challenge to Sovereign Immunity 
International relations scholarship has much to contribute to the elaboration of the 
role of institutional boundaries on cooperation and conflict. IR theorists' focus on state 
sovereignty in particular directly bears on the theoretical importance of institutional 
boundaries. State sovereignty is at root a set of rules about institutional boundaries that 
divide political and territorial space?5 There is substantial debate within the IR literature 
as to whether the international political order is moving from one institutionalized as a 
sovereign state system to one that is either an international or transnational society?6 The 
question in this debate for IR theorists is whether the boundaries of state sovereignty are 
eroding, and yielding to some new set of institutions and relationships. 
State sovereignty has two components that neatly map the intuitive notion of 
boundaries: internal sovereignty and external sovereignty.37 Internally, the classical state 
sovereign has exclusive authority over a particular territory, in other words freedom from 
35 This focus on sovereignty on a set of rules is emphasized by the English School and constructivists. See 
in particular Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), Friedrich 
V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). and K. J. 
Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
36 Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953), Ernst B. Haas, 
Beyond the Nation State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), Ernst B. Haas, "Reason and Change 
in International Life," Journal of International Affairs 44 (1990), Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: 
Problematizing Modernity in International Relations.", Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation 
and the International State," American Political Science Review 88 (1994), Wendt, Social Theory of 
International Politics, Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., State Sovereignty as Social 
Construct. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
37 Bull, The Anarchical Society., ch. 1. Robert Jackson denotes these as negative and positive sovereignty in 
Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), pp. 26-31. 
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well as to make reparations for wrongful acts .40 The most important obligation is to 
refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other states, as this would violate a 
state's right to internal sovereignty. 
The erosion of the institution of internal sovereignty has received a lot of attention 
in the academic literature. The notion of exclusive authority over a territory was 
questioned first by the literature on the impact of interdependence, then the newer focus 
on globalization's erosion of state contro1.41 These works focus on the defacto erosion of 
internal sovereignty. Here the focus is on the reduced capacity of the state to control what 
occurs within its borders under the strains of increasing economic and information flows. 
As Stephen Krasner notes, such de facto challenges to internal sovereignty are not 
particularly new. He therefore argues against over-exaggerating the erosion of state 
sovereignty. Following the realist tradition, he views sovereignty less as a constitutive 
institution creating a society of sovereign states but rather as a cognitive script enacted 
whenever powerful actors deem it usefu1.42 Krasner argues that international institutions 
are fundamentally less institutionalized and path dependent than domestic institutions. As 
Krasner says, 
Compromising the sovereign state model is always available as a policy option 
because there is no authority structure to prevent it: nothing can preclude rulers 
40 International law has codified the legal rights and responsibilities of states. For a primer in states' rights 
and responsibilities, see Barry Carter, Phillip R. Trimble, and Curtis A. Bradley, eds., International Law, 
4th ed. (NY: Aspen Publishers, 2003). 
41 and Distant Proximities (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph 
S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1989), James 
Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory o/Change and Continuity (Princeton. NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), Susan Strange, The Retreat o/the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), Jessica Tuchman Mathews , "Power Shift," Foreign Affairs Jan!Feb 1997" and Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
42 Stephen D. Krasner, "Westphalia and All That," in Ideas and Foreign Policy, ed. Judith Goldstein and 
Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
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expectations of humanitarian conduct," in effect placing sovereign states within a broader 
web of international societal institutions.45 
The human rights regime has changed the boundary of state sovereignty in two 
ways. First, because certain human rights are understood to be universal, it has reduced 
the legitimate scope of all states' internal sovereignty, in effect shrinking the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the state and increasing their accountability to other states. The past few 
years have seen efforts to institutionalize a new boundary, one of "contingent 
sovereignty," that links sovereign authority directly to the treatment of citizens.46 Second , 
it has given individual human beings legal personality to confront states. While at the 
time of their creation international conventions may have been entered into cynically and 
deemed to have little real significance, today these conventions have altered the capacity 
of individuals to act at the international level. They have also changed the ability of states 
to act with legal impunity at home.47 A few examples help make this shift in the 
institutional boundaries evident. 
Sovereign Immunity Confronts Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The Pinochet Precedent 
Increasingly, sovereigns are no longer able to claim absolute immunity from other states ' 
interference within their own boundaries or even beyond their borders. This applies both 
to the agents of the sovereign state as a whole, and to the head of state. The classical 
institution of state sovereignty conferred absolute immunity from laws and courts within 
45 Jackson (1990), p. 141. 
46 See United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report o/the Secretary-
General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (New York: United Nations, 2004) 
http://www.un.org/secureworldlreport2.pdf, and United Nations, In Larger Freedom: Towards 
Development. Security and Human Rights For All: Report o/the Secretary General (New York: United 
Nations, 2005), http://www.un.orgllargerfreedomlcontents.htm. 
47 Krasner (2001) and Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights. and the 
Demise o/Communism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
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of States and Their Property. The restriction to exclude private property transactions 
(jure gestionis) from governmental actions (jure imperii) is easily explained through 
rationalist accounts of reciprocal policy coordination though it was never easy to 
practice.51 What is less easily explained from a straightforward rationalist manner is why 
. states now increasingly exclude official human rights 'abuses from immunity. A shift in 
boundaries has placed gross human rights abuses under extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
removing states' exclusive jurisdiction over the persons on their territory. This boundary 
shift has become the center of a battle royal between governments and judiciaries. 
1998 was a seminal year for international human rights. The arrest and 17 month 
detention of General Augusto Pinochet in London on a Spanish warrant set a precedent 
that has again reduced the boundaries of sovereignty immunity.52 As a consequence, 
individual legal access to state officials dramatically increased and the privileges of state 
sovereigns have been further eroded. The mere act of serving a former head of state with 
an arrest warrant was an historic event, as states rarely place their human rights 
obligations above the "political benefits of avoiding international disagreements.,,53 The 
Pinochet case fundamentally undermined the role of the sovereign state in two ways: 
immunity for official violations of human rights was revoked, and national courts 
exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction to punish human rights crimes in foreign countries, 
despite the diplomatic consequences. 
The Pinochet precedent was not set overnight, and did not start or end in Great 
Britain. In 1996 Spanish and later non-Spanish citizens and their families filed suit in 
51 Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity revised edition (New York: The New Press, 2002): 405. 
52 Agence France Press, "A Chronology of the Pinochet Affair" 9 July 2001. 
53 Daniel Rothenberg, '''Let Justice Judge": An Interview with Judge Baltasar Garzon and Analysis of His 
Ideas,' Human Rights Quarterly 24, 4 (2002): 928. See also Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity 
revised edition (New York: The New Press, 2002): ch. 10. 
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the offenders are 'common enemies of mankind and all nations have an equal interest in 
their apprehension and prosecution.",55 Universal jurisdiction was used in the 18th and 
19th centuries to prosecute pirates and slave traders. It fell out of use until the Nuremberg 
war crimes trials at the end of World War II. There, the allies relied explicitly on 
universal jurisdiction to prosecute Nazi officials for acts that were not illegal under Nazi 
Germany's laws, but were deemed to be "crimes against humanity.,,56 
Using the argument that the alleged crimes committed were subject to universal 
jurisdiction, the Spanish investigating judge issued arrest warrants and an extradition 
request in late October 1998 while General Pinochet was on an unannounced visit to 
Great Britain for medical treatment. After his arrest, the Pinochet case went straight to 
Britain's highest court, the Law Lords. The fIrst panel of Law Lords ruled 3-2 in favor of 
extraditing the former Chilean head of state to Spain to stand trial of charges of crimes 
against humanity, unless the Home Office interfered. Remarkably, Home Secretary Jack 
Straw refused to step in after the fIrst trial, "fInding," as Geoffrey Robertson puts it, "no 
reason not to let the law take its course.,,57 Straw allowed Pinochet's extradition hearing 
to proceed. He explicitly rejected the notion that Pinochet enjoyed immunity for the 
alleged crimes, and held that Britain's obligations under international law overcame the 
usual deference to state sovereignty.58 After the link between one of the Law Lords and 
SS Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others 
Ex Parte Pinochet [Ex Parte Pinochet] (24 March 1999), citing the case Demanjuk v. Petrovsky (1985). 
S6 For a discussion of Nuremberg and the notion of crimes against humanity, see Gary J. Bass, Stay the 
Hand of Vengeance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
57 Robertson: 397-398. 
58 It is usual for a foreign court to give deference to a home court if that court is undertaking proceedings on 
the same issue and has a stronger claim of jurisdiction. Chilean politicians argued that Pinochet should be 
tried in Chile; Straw rejected the argument that the possibility of this trial superseded Britain's requirement 
to obey its commitments under the European Convention on Extradition. BBC News World Service, 
"Straw sets out his reasons," December 9,1998 Published at 17:57 GMT, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uklllhi1ulcpolitics/231775.stm; accessed 23 August 2004. 
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committed in Argentina in the 1970s and 1980s. 63 Argentina itself has shifted its position 
and has detained 46 former military officials and repealed laws and edicts granting them 
and other officials' lifetime immunity in preparation for extradition to European 
countries. Its Supreme Court ruled in August 2004 that there is no statute of limitations 
for crimes against humanity.64 In June 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Alien 
Tort Statute of 1789 CATS), which allows U.S. courts to assert jurisdiction for well-
defined crimes committed outside the United States and against foreigners that are 
against the law of nations or self-executing treaties. The Court expressly rejected the 
claim that the ATS was meaningless, and affirmed the right of foreigners to use federal 
courts to seek damages for a limited set of acts. The Court also reaffirmed the judiciary's 
role in enforcing well-defmed customary international law , such as the prohibition on 
state-sanctioned torture and genocide.65 In March 2005 a US Appellate Court upheld the 
first judgment in the US against a Chilean military officer for acts committed in violation 
of the ATS and the Torture Victim Protection Act.66 European courts continue to issue 
arrest warrants and extradition requests, in some cases even against current government 
63 Gretchen Peters, "Mexico Gives Boost to Universal Jurisdiction," Christian Science Monitor 13 June 
2003. 
64 Larry Rohter, Argentines Face Human Rights Trials in Europe," New York Times 28 July 2003 and 
Stacie Jonas, "The Ripple Effect of the Pinochet Case" Human Rights Brief, Volume 11, Issue 3, pgs. 36-
38; and BBC News World Service, "Vital rights ruling in Argentina," 24 August, 2004, 23:45 GMT 00:45 
UK, available at http://news.bbc.co.uklllhilworldiamericas/3596316.stm (accessed 25 August 2004). 
65 542 U.S. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004). The Court in this ruling gave federal courts the ability to 
decide which acts violate customary international law , but made very clear that only very specifically 
defmed acts that were clearly accepted as prohibited were pennissible grounds for taking jurisdiction. They 
specifically referenced state-sanctioned torture and state- or privately-sanctioned genocide as passing this 
threshold. They reaffmned the role of US courts in enforcing customary international law in the Paquete 
Habana (1900) and Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (1980) cases. Filartiga turned solely on whether torture was 
prohibited under customary international law , while the Paquete Habana set the precedent that US courts 
would apply the customary law of nations. Official torture is widely understood to be against the law of 
nations, as codified in the Convention on Torture (ratified by the US in 1994). To bolster the prohibition on 
torture, the US enacted the Torture Victims Protection Act in 1991 after the Filartiga case. 
66 International Law in Brief, April 12 2005, American Society of International Law. 
http://www.asil.orglilib/2oo5104/ilib050412.htm#j3 . (accessed August 28, 2005). 
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territory, convicting two Rwandans of genocide in July 2005.68 Spain's highest court has 
also limited the Audencia Nacional's jurisdiction to cases involving Spanish nationals. 
Several European states have declined to exercise jurisdiction over current foreign 
officials. German courts went beyond the ICJ ruling to hold that aformer Chinese head of 
State was entitled to inimunity from German criminal jurisdiction. European countries 
have also taken steps to limit the right of individuals to bring suit against foreign officials 
and have enacted legislation shifting this authority to state prosecutors. 69 
Yet at the same time, the number of cases prosecuted in Western Europe under 
universal jurisdiction has steadily risen since 2000. Several European countries have 
developed dedicated police and investigatory units to handle international crimes 
including human rights abuses. The European Union has set up a "Network of contact 
points in respect of persons responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes" to facilitate EU-wide cooperation in investigation and prosecution of 
international crimes and emphasized the need for EU members to prosecute such cases.70 
In 2004 Interpol began organizing Expert Meetings on these crimes in response to the 
increasing number of universal jurisdiction prosecutions?l Latin American countries 
have participated in a "justice cascade," stripping former officials of immunity and trying 
them for human rights violations.72 African countries may be embarking on one, with the 
2000 indictment of the former President of Chad for torture and crimes against humanity 
68 International Law in Brief, July 19 2005, American Society of International Law. 
http://www.asil.org/ilib/2005107/ilib050719.htm#b 1 , (accessed August 27, 2(05). 
69 Bhuta and Schurr, "Universal Jurisdiction in Europe," 8-13 25-27. 
70 Bhuta and Schurr, "Universal Jurisdiction in Europe," 3, 10-13 and 21. 
71 Bhuta and Schurr, "Universal Jurisdiction in Europe," 21-23. 
72 Ellen L. Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink "International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America," 
International Organization 54 (2000): 633,654-57 and Ellen L. Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink, "The Justice 
Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America," Chicago Journal 
of International Law 2,1 (2001). 
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considered public or officials acts. While not the full scale victory for universal 
jurisdiction that human rights activists hoped for, this smaller shift still carries important 
political implications, as states increasingly accept that their sovereign rights are 
circumscribed by human rights. 
Crimes against Humanity and the International Criminal Court 
The challenge to the boundary of absolute sovereign immunity started not with a 
frontal assault on sovereign immunity but with an innovation in the boundaries of the 
institution known as the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law. The law 
of armed conflict arose to limit the discretion of military officers and their political 
commanders in the conduct of an activity that is legally recognized as being the right 
only of states: war?5 This institution sought to constrain the authority of war makers by 
stipulating the humanitarian boundaries beyond which they could not go - in effect 
bounding the jurisdiction of war within the institutional boundary of humanity?6 
This boundary change was formalized in recent times in the Nuremberg Charter 
adopted by the Allies on August 8, 1945. Through the Nuremberg Charter, foreign states, 
75 The 1899 and 1907 Hague and 1949 Geneva Conventions codifying the laws of war expressly recognize 
authorized state agents as the only legal combatants in conflict. Other combatants are illegal as they do not 
have legal authority to act. 
76 This is expressly laid out in the Martens clause, included in the preambles to the 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Conventions Respecting the Laws and Customs of War: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem 
it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the 
inhabitants and the belligerent remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law 
of nations , as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of 
humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience. [Emphasis added.] 
Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annex Regulations, 
18 October 1907. See also Diane Orentlicher, "The Law of Universal Conscience: Genocide and Crimes 
Against Humanity ," paper was presented at the Committee on Conscience conference Genocide and 
Crimes Against Humanity: Early Warning and Prevention on December 9,1998, at the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum, p. 8. 
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wartime activities.82 This effectively removed a temporal limitation on when a crime 
against humanity could occur (only within wartime), as well as a geographic limitation 
(only in regions where there was interstate conflict). 
This expansion of the territorial jurisdiction over crimes against humanity was 
codified in the UN Security Council's adoption of the Statute establishing the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The ICTY Statute 
gave the Tribunal authority to prosecute crimes conducted in either inter-state or internal 
armed conflicts.83 The temporal expansion was institutionalized in the Statute of the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda (lCTR) and the International Criminal Court. The 
ICTR and ICC statutes do not require that the acts be conducted in times of armed 
conflict, only that they be "part of a widespread or systematic attack on any civilian 
population.,,84 All three stipulate that no state can conduct either genocide or crimes 
against humanity.85 Regardless of whether a state of armed conflict is in existence, these 
crimes are justiciable, and starting with Nuremberg, there is no statute of limitations on 
when individuals can be prosecuted for crimes against humanity. Another incursion on 
the traditional boundaries of sovereignty and sovereign immunity that Nuremberg began 
was that of individual responsibility for state-sanctioned crimes. The Nuremberg 
82 Orentlicher (1998), p. 13-14. 
83 ICTY Statute, Article 5, adopted May 25,1993. 
84 Rome Statute of the ICC, Art. 7, adopted July 17, 1998. See also ICTR Statute, Article 3, adopted 
November 8,1994. 
85 Crimes against humanity are defined in the ICC Statute as "any of the following acts when committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of 
international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any 
identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined 
in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law , 
in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; 
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons; G) The crime of apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar 
character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health." 
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humanity, the ICC makes no distinction between former (such as Pinochet) and current 
officials. As is well-known, ICTY Prosecutor Carla del Ponte indicted a sitting head of 
state, Slobodan Milosevic. The ICC explicitly rejects sovereign immunity for current or 
former state officials. ICC Statute Article 27.2 states, "[i]mmunities or special procedural 
rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or 
international law , shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a 
person." 
Political Implications of Shifts in the Boundaries of Sovereignty 
What are the political consequences of this shift in the institutional boundaries of 
sovereignty? Aside from promoting greater accountability for human rights and reducing 
the impunity of dictators, this shift has altered the legitimate realms of authoritative 
action of states and individuals. On the one hand, states appear to be increasingly 
subjecting themselves to a reduced sphere of exclusive sovereign authority and to greater 
international accountability. On the other, states have expanded their claims to 
domestically adjudicate cases that have traditionally been off limits, protected by the 
boundary of state sovereignty. Individuals have much greater ability to access national 
and international courts to seek redress for acts committed by state officials. In the 
theoretical terms we adopt here, the institutional boundaries of state sovereignty are now 
more permeable. While sovereignty may never have been as institutionalized as domestic 
institutions, this change in its boundaries has real political consequences, not all of which 
have been welcomed. 
What makes these shifts possible is the establishment of other institutions, in 
particular the Convention against Torture (CAT) and the Genocide Convention. These 
33 
contained provisions that prevented politically-motivated prosecutions and limited ICC 
jurisdiction to only those cases where a state refused or failed to prosecute the alleged 
crimes at home. It failed however in gaining blanket immunity for US military personnel 
in the Statute.90 The U.S. Congress stepped into the act in 2000 when Senator Jesse 
Helms introduced the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA), which 
President Bush signed into law on August 2, 2002. The APSA prohibits U.S. cooperation 
with the ICC and seeks to regulate U.S. cooperation with the United Nations and foreign 
countries to guarantee U.S. protection from ICC actions. It also bars any U.S. military 
assistance to states that have ratified the ICC treaty unless the President waives this 
requirement. The ASPA was quickly dubbed the "Hague Invasion Act" because it 
authorizes the President to "use all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the 
release of any person ... detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of the 
International Criminal Court.,,91 
The Bush Administration has gone much farther in its efforts to restore the 
traditional boundaries of sovereign immunity; it has sought to reverse the bounding of 
state sovereignty within human rights and humanitarian law. It revoked the U.S. signature 
on the ICC Statute. It has also exerted a tremendous amount of time, pressure and threats 
to force countries, especially parties to the Statute, to sign bilateral immunity agreements 
(BIAs) covering U.S. officials and military personnel, claiming the right to do so under 
Article 98 of the ICC Statute. The EU Council subsequently pronounced that such BIAs 
are illegal, and counseled member states not to sign them as they would violate their legal 
90 Jonathan Teppennan, "Contempt of Court," Washington Monthly (November 2000). 
91 "American Servicemembers' Protection Act," The American Journal of International Law 96,4 (Oct. 
2002): 975-977 . 
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actors-states or individual human beings-have the authority to act both domestically 
and internationally. These struggles arise precisely because of the important ways in 
which changes in the boundaries of one institution, the law of armed conflict, can have 
ripple effects that change the boundary of another institution, sovereign immunity. 
Conclusion 
The nature of and change in the boundaries of discrete institutions have important 
consequences for broader social organization and order. Institutional boundaries deserve 
attention because they are what structure -- in very different ways -- the amount and ease 
of access between institutional domains. In defining that access, they can serve to 
reproduce or alter institutions. The nature of boundaries determines whether and which 
actors are able or unable to operate legitimately within and across institutional 
jurisdictions. Boundaries transmit social and institutional rules internally, as relationship 
between sovereign governments and their citizens regarding who has the right to bring 
suit for human rights abuses attest. But boundaries also transmit social rules between and 
among institutions, as the discussion of sovereign immunity highlights. In these ways, 
boundaries can protect institutions and contribute to institutional survival and continuity. 
They also organize and stabilize social orders, fostering collective action in some realms 
and regulating conflict in others. 
The creation of boundaries or their change can reverberate throughout other 
institutions in society, shaping their relations and the overall degree of institutionalization 
of the values that a society is founded on. Boundaries transmit social values and roles to 
institutional and societal actors and individuals. For these reasons, more attention needs 
to be paid to the boundaries of institutions. Without understanding how these borders 
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